Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 4

Article 1

September 1934

Summary Proceedings in Court Receiverships
Julius H. Miner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Julius H. Miner, Summary Proceedings in Court Receiverships, 12 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 233 (1934).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol12/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT
REVIEW
Vol. XII

SEPTEMBER,

1934

No. 4

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS IN COURT
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MINER*

P

ROPER use of summary proceedings to effect a less
expensive but quicker and more effective administration of receivership estates is a subject of much importance at a time when the courts are clogged with suits in
which its receivers or other officers are liquidating the
assets of insolvent debtors. The recent amendments to
the Federal bankruptcy laws under which the bankruptcy courts lend their aid and supervision to corporate
reorganizations and the readjustment and extension of
obligations, whether corporate or individual, are multiplying the number of estates which are being administered by the courts and emphasize the importance of
rapid and inexpensive discovery and collection of assets.
The recently adopted Business Corporation Act in Illinois
gives to courts of equity in this state for the first time
broad powers and jurisdiction in the liquidation and reorganization of business corporations' and will burden
the state courts with further responsibilities.
While considerations of economy, speed and effectiveness stand as strong argument for the employ of summary proceedings in receivership suits, yet, if the courts
are to evade the criticism of "government by contempt,"
it is clear that in their use the greatest care will have
* Member of the Illinois Bar; Master in Chancery, Circuit Court of Cook
County.
1
Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 32, sec. 86.91.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

to be exercised to keep within the limits set by the law.
These limits, together with their resulting significations,
are considered in the following review of authorities.
For the sake of clarity the subject has been divided and,
consequently, appears under three captions: first, discovery of assets, under which will be treated the means
available to ascertain all of the defendant corporation's'
property, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal;
second, collection of assets, under which will be discussed
the questions connected with the acquisition of the possession of such property for the court by summary proceedings; and third, contempt, under which will be defined the essential elements of this remedy commonly
used in this connection.
DISCOVERY OF ASSETS

The principle which underlies the duty of the receiver
to petition the appointing court for instructions as regards the property of the defendant corporation and his
right to receive such aid by order or otherwise is fundamental. Basically, this duty and right rest upon the fact
that immediately the receiver is appointed the possession
of all the assets and effects involved in the receivership
suit vests in him as an officer of the court and as a disinterested party to the proceeding.'
The assets and
effects deemed to be in the possession of the receiver in
custodia legis cover a wide variety of property interests4
but unless there is some element present which makes
the general rule inoperative, the assets and effects must
be within the jurisdiction of the appointing court.'
Where the possession of the receiver is not physical but
2 References to "defendant corporation" and "defendant corporation's
property" in this article are for convenience. The rules and principles herein
discussed are equally applicable to an individual defendant or such individual's property.
3While citation of authority is hardly necessary to substantiate this
statement, reference may be made to Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Co., 316 III.
336 (1925); Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283 (1901) ; People v. Weigley,
155 Ill. 491 (1895); Coates v. Cunningham, 80 Ill. 467 (1875) ; Hooper v.
Winston, 24 Ill. 354 (1860); Bright v. Riedy, 243 Ill. App. 314 (Ist Dist.,
1927).
4 See 23 R. C. L., see. 8, p. 13.
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constructive, as is the case, for example, where the property is in the hands of a party to the proceedings or an
officer of the court, it is his duty to reduce to physical
possession such property, making it available for the
payment of the creditors.6 "No other rule would be consistent with the high responsibility involved where the
court divests owners of property of their possession for
the purpose of a safer administration and a more just distribution by the court." '7 Indeed, an essential object of
the appointment of a receiver is the preservation of the
property of the defendant corporation, which object is
greatly facilitated by the reduction to possession in cnstodia legis.8
For purposes of reducing property held in constructive
possession to physical possession most economically and,
hence, preserving the assets in existence most completely,
the rule is well established that a receiver as an officer of
the court is entitled on all suitable occasions to apply to
the court for instructions and advice and should never
hesitate to apply for it when questions of intricacy or
difficulty occur. 9 Furthermore, not only has the receiver
a right to ask the court for instructions which may aid
in a preservation of the estate, but it is possible that he
may actually be under a duty to ask. t °
5

Zacher v. Fidelity Trust and Safety-Vault Co., 106 F. 593 (C. C. A., 6th
Cir., 1901).
6 Brown v. Bass, 4 Wall. 262 (1867); Buchanan v. Hicks, 98 Ark. 370, 136
S. W. 177 (1911); Brandt v. Allen, 76 Iowa 50, 40 N. W. 82 (1888):
Eversmann v. Schmitt, 53 Ohio 174, 41 N. E. 139 (1895); Cushing v. Perot,
175 Pa. St. 66, 34 A. 447 (1896); Tillinghast v. Champlin, 4 R. I. 173, 67

Am. Dec. 510 (1856); Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41 Wash.
385, 83 P. 898 (1906).
7 Ralph E. Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers, (2nd
Ed., The W. H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati, 1929), I see. 378.
s Metropolitan Trust Co. v. North Carolina Lumber Co., 162 F. 170 (Cir. Ct.,
E. D. N. C., 1908); Atlantic Trust Co, v. Dana, 128 F. 209 (C. C. A:, 8th Cir.,

1903).
9

James L. High, A Treatise on the Law of Receivers (4th Ed. by Shirley
T. High, Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1910), sec. 188, citing In the matter
of Van Allen, 37 Barb. 225; Smith v. New York Consolidated Stage Co., 18
Ab. Pr. 419; Curtis v. Leavitt, 1 Ab. Pr. 274; Lottimer v. Lord, 4 E. D. Smith
183; People v. Security Life Insurance Co., 79 N. Y. 267.
10 Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Co., 224 F. 289 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., 1915);
In re Angel, 131 Mich. 345, 91 N. W. 611 (1902).
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As a consequence of this wide latitude it must be conceded that the receiver has the right to petition the court
for instructions, even though it may be necessary for the
court, before it is in a position to give such instructions,
to subpoena, for purposes of examination, not only parties to the proceeding but all others who may appear to
have relevant knowledge or information; and it may
question them not only as to the location of the receivership property but as to its collectibility as well. This
knowledge is material to a preservation of the assets, for
in the one instance it may cause an increase by revealing
to the receiver property hitherto unknown, while in the
other instance it may prevent a loss, since an action upon
a note which is not collectible is bound to involve an expenditure of time and money without any return. Such
a petition to the court should set out: (a) the time and
mode of the petitioner's appointment; (b) a general
description of the receivership property with respect to
which knowledge and information is desired; (c) a statement of the necessity for acquiring such knowledge; (d)
a specific request. for the aid of the court in reducing to
possession all the property of the defendant corporation;
and (e) a rule for the appearance of those suggested as
having such information.
By reason of the court's duty to respond to this petition for instructions, an order directing the appearance
of such persons as may be suggested by the receiver as
having knowledge or information which would facilitate
the collection of the assets of the defendant corporation
and for their examination is proper. The persons to be
embraced in this order need not be limited to the former
directors, stockholders, officers, trustees, agents, servants
or privies of the defendant corporation, but'might properly include anyone who has any- interest, knowledge. or
information concerning the assets held by.the receiver.
Accordingly, makers, guarantors, or .endorsers-of certain
of the notes which the receiver holds and which it is his
duty to collect are persons within the meaning of the rule
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here advanced. The order should be in writing," and
parties who show an adverse interest to the request made
in the petition of the receiver should have a right to appear and be heard previous to the entry of the order. 2
The form of the order itself should make provision for
the following points: (a) the gist of the receiver's petition; (b) a finding that the aid and assistance of the
court is necessary, with reference to the matter involved;
(c) that the cause be set down for hearing on a day certain; and (d) a direction to the clerk of the court to issue
subpoenas.
While the scope of such an order would be broader
than usual, it will be seen that it is not broader than is
generally necessary in receiverships if all the property
of the defendant corporation, including debts, choses in
action, etc., is to be reduced to a possession in custodia
legis and is to be made available to the depositors and
creditors. Within this scope it matters not whether the
persons subpoenaed are parties to the proceeding. It is
said in Clark on Receivers :13
When the court appoints a receiver of a part or all of the
property of a debtor the appointing court is given full and
exclusive jurisdiction over the res. This jurisdiction over the
res gives such appointing court the right to bring before it
persons having possession of any of the assets properly covered by the appointing order or having claims on.said assets,
or who are so indebted to the original defendant that the
claim for such indebtedness forms part of the res or assets.

4

COLLECTION OF AsSETS

It must be borne in mind, however, that the order for
the examination of witnesses never gives to the court
.the -power to proceed. summarily against those subpoenaed to testify concerning the assets of the defendant
corporation. The scope of such summary proceedings as
are allowed to be taken in and by the appointing court
" Face v. Hall, 183 Mich. 22. 148 N. W.- 777 (1914).
12 Clark on Receivers, (2nd Ed.), I, 715, sec. 102.
IsIbid. I, sec. 532.
14 Henderson on Chancery Practice, at page 360, affirms the same general
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is based upon certain principles of procedure protecting
what may be described as the right to due process of
law. What this scope is becomes our next inquiry, the
conclusions to which are summarized under the following
headings.
A court of equity taking custody of assets and placing
them in the hands of a receiver may bring summary proceedings concerning such assets where the possession,
physical or constructive, is in the receiver as an officer
of the court. This rule is the basis for bringing summary proceedings against both parties to the suit, officers
of the court, etc., on the one hand, and strangers to the
suit on the other.
The power of the court to proceed summarily against
parties to the suit, officers of the court, etc., as to such
assets of the defendant corporation as are held by them
at-the time of the receiver's appointment is so well recognized that this power is usually classed separately as
though the fact of its existence were its sole justification.
Properly analyzed, however, it is apparent that such
power rests upon the rule already advanced that the
appointing court may bring summary proceedings concerning the assets of which the receiver has possession,
physical or constructive. That the receiver has the possession, constructive where not physical (both forms
being included generally in the more common terms
"custody" and "control"), of all the assets of the defendant corporation for the benefit of all the parties
rule as follows:
"Where the assets are openly visible, the receiver can at once take actual
possession, but where their character, amount and whereabouts are unknown,
the power of the court is necessarily invoked to aid the receiver in the discovery and obtaining such possession. This is done by an order requiring
the defendant and others to appear before the master and submit to an
examination touching the location, amount and character of the property
and effects to the possession of which the receiver is entitled."
The foregoing statement of the rule by Mr. Henderson was quoted and
followed by Scanlan, J., who delivered the opinion of the court in Nartzik
v. Ehman, 191 Ill. App. 71 (1st Dist., 1914). In Leopold v. The People, 41
Ill. App. 293 (1st Dist., 1891), aff'd (1892) in 140 Ill. 552, Gary, J., considered the use of an order for the purpose of acquiring information. See also
Filkins v. Adams, 60 Il1. App. 410 (1st Dist., 1895).
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ultimately to have the title or the right of possession, is
substantiated by a legion of cases. 5 But though the receiver is thus favored as regards the right to possession
of the assets, that is, their custody and control, neither
the order of appointment nor any summary proceeding
of the court can change the title or the right of possession
with respect to those assets. 6

Attention is now called to the possible extension of
the class of parties to the proceeding. This may be accomplished either by intervention or by voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Intervention is
a well known proceeding in equity by means of which a

stranger, asserting a claim, legal or equitable, may upon
his petition be made a party to the receivership suit by

leave of the court. The important effect is that the receiver becomes constructively possessed of the assets
of the defendant corporation which are at the time in
the hands of the intervening petitioner upon the granting
of the order to intervene. In other words, so far as the
custody of the assets is concerned a stranger who becomes a party to the suit by intervention
is in the same
17
position as the original parties.
An instructive case of voluntary submission is Whelan
v. Enterprise Transportation Company.'

The question

15Quincy, etc., R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82 (1892); Fosdick v.
Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1879); Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52 (1852) ; U. S.
Mortgage & T. Co. v. Missouri, K. &. T. Ry Co., 269 F. 497 (C. C. A., 5th
Cir., 1921); Johnson v. Garner, 233 F. 756 (Dist. Ct., Nev., 1916); In re Muir,
212 F. 495 (Dist. Ct., N. D. Pa., 1914); H. K. Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 F.
305 (C. C. A., 3rd Cir., 1909); In re John L. Nelson & Bro. Co., 149 F.
590 (Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., 1907); Atchison, T. &. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Osborn,
148 F. 606 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1906); Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsenthall,
116 F. 961 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., 1902); Standish v. Musgrove, 223 Ill. 500
(1906); Vandalia v. St. Louis, V. T. H. R. R. Co., 209 Ill. 73 (1904);
Coates v. Cunningham, 80 Ill. 467 (1875); Bright v. Riedy, 243 Ill. App.
314 (1st Dist., 1927) ; Spiegel v. Wolpers, 226 Ill. App. 446 (1st Dist., 1922) ;
Burr v. Wentworth, 202 Ill. App. 13 (1st Dist., 1916); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Chapman, 132 111.App. 55 (1st Dist., 1907); Burleigh v. Keck, 84 Ill.
App. 607 (1st Dist., 1899); Gary v. Brown, 33 III. App. 435 (lst Dist., 1889).
16 See cases cited in note 15 supra; also Union National Bank of Chicago
v. Bank of Kansas City, 136 U. S. 223 (1890); Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287 (1890).
17 In general, see Clark on Receivers, (2nd Ed.) I, Ch. 18.
18164 F. 95 (Cir. Ct., D. Mass., 1908).
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here involved was whether or not the filing of a claim
by the creditor of an insolvent corporation, for which
a receiver had been appointed, brought him within the
jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of the collection
of the receiver's claim against hm. The court ans-wered
in the negative, but in coming to this conclusion it was
necessary to distinguish White v. Ew.,ng, 19 where the receiver prayed in his petition to bring in all the debtors by
bill or petition in one suit, alleging that it was so requested by the creditors in order to avoid the expense of
a separate suit against each; and the bill was brought
in that form against one hundred and thirty defendants,
who were charged to be severally indebted upon notes
given for lots of land purchased from the company. The
ground upon wh*ch the distinction was made was the
following statement of Brown, J., in the United States
Supreme Court:
No exception was taken to the form of the bill by demurrer
or otherwise, but the defendants answered, denying their
liability. The question certified does not, as we understand
it, demand the opinion of this court as to whether a single
bill against all these defendants would lie for the amounts
severally due by them (upon which point we do not feel called
upon to express an opinion); but whether, so far as in said
suit the receiver claimed the right to recover from any one
debtor a sum not exceeding $2000, the court had jurisdiction
to render a judgment against them.
In addition to parties to the suit and officers of the
court there are certain other subsidiary classes holding
assets of the defendant corporation, against whom summary proceedings may be taken; and the basis is again
the doctrine of constructive possession. Thus, persons
who hold assets involved in the receivership suit as
trustees, agents, servants, or privies of the defendant corporation may be brought before the court by summary petition; and if they show no beneficial claim or title in themselves, the court may order them to surrender such assets
19 159 U. S. 36 (1895).
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to the receiver. In Miles v. New South Building & Loan
Association,20 the assets of the insolvent corporation
were in the possession of a stranger to the suit, which held
them to secure the bondholders and creditors of the former. Although the opinion in the case was given over
thirty years ago, the grasp which it shows of receivership
problems is thoroughly modern and is quoted at length.
Chief Justice Shelby states:
The defense is made that the court has no jurisdiction to
proceed in this summary way, but that a formal suit should
be brought to recover the assets, and that on the facts the
Company is entitled to retain the possession of the assets. It
-is stated in Parker v. Browning, 8 Paige 388, that "if the property is in the possession of a third person who claims the right
to retain it, the receiver must either proceed by suit in the
ordinary way to try his right to it, or the complainant shall
make such third person a party to the suit, and apply to have
the receivership extended to the property in his hands." This
case is often quoted approvingly, but usually with an emphasis
in the context on the limiting words that the third person, to
make the formal suit necessary, should be one who "claims the
right to retain the property."
This claim of the right to
retain it does not mean a bare refusal to surrender it. It
means the assertion of some right or interest in the property;
not a mere possession or a holding of the property for others
who are parties to the suit, or whose rights are protected by
the suit. The practice of requiring the surrender of property
to the receiver by summary motion or petition is well recognized
where it is held by the attorneys, agents, and employes of the
defendant.... The same practice seems not improper where the
property in question is held by a defendant in the motion, not
for himself, but as trustee, and so, in a sense, as the agent, for
those interested in the assets, including the defendant in the
case. In modern litigation in equity a defendant's property
may be in the possession of hundreds of agents and bailees, holding under various agreements, and it is not reasonable that a
receiver appointed of all of the assets should be required to
20

95 F. 919 (Cir. Ct., N. D. Ga., 1899).
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sue each bailee and agent separately, .or that all should be made
parties to the main suit, should they merely refuse to surrender
the assets. When a receiver is appointed for a corporation
doing business by agents in many states, to make the appointment serve its purpose the court should have jurisdiction to
require a surrender of the property to the receiver. The order
in such cases requiring the delivery of the property to the receiver does- not affect the title to the property, nor even the
right of possession. It only places the assets in the custody of
the officer of the court, who holds them for those ultimately
shown to be entitled to them .... The decision of the motion affects
no beneficial interest in the property. When the motion is disallowed, it is not a thing adjudged as to the ownership of the
property against the receiver; nor is the granting of the motion
conclusive against the defendant in the motion as to any title
or interest in the property. In the former case the receiver
could bring a formal suit, and in the latter the defendant in
the action could sue the receiver, or intervene in the litigation.
This summary proceeding is not opposed to the constitutional
provision that no one shall be deprived of his property without
due course of law, because the receiver does not become vested
with any beneficial title to the property. . . . In litigations involving the receiverships and settlements of insolvent corporations it is desirable that the procedure be concentrated in one
cause, so far as practicable. In White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36,
15 Sup. Ct. 1018, it was held, in a suit to distribute the assets
of an insolvent corporation, that an ancillary suit or ancillary
suits might be brought in the same case by the receiver against
130 persons who were indebted to the corporation. There
seems to be no good reason why persons in possession of the
assets of the corporation cannot be brought before the court
by summary petition, and, if they admit the possession, and
show no beneficial claim or title in themselves, be required to
surrender such assets to the receiver. The Company claims no
ownership in the assets. Its claim is as trustee for others. The
main suit is to settle an insolvent corporation, and the rights
of all of the beneficiaries in the trust represented by the Company can be fully protected by the court in the case in which
the receiver was appointed. The assets consist of notes and
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mortgages, which must be speedily collected, or there will be
much loss. The Company has stated, and it seems evident, that
the assets will be lost to a great extent unless a vigilant effort
21
is made to collect them.

The same rule applies where the persons who hold
assets are officers or stockholders of the corporation for
which the receiver was appointed; but this rule, likewise,
is limited by cases where it can be shown that there exists
in the holders a beneficial interest claimed adversely;
such persons cannot be required summarily to deliver
the property to the receiver.2 2 This rule, however, does
not extend to assignees and purchasers of property from
23
the corporation prior to the receivership proceedings.
The rule that summary proceedings may be used to reduce to physical possession those assets held by the
receiver in constructive possession, is not qualified by
reason that the parties proceeded against are strangers
to the receivership suit. To introduce the law supporting
this statement, resort may be had to the conservative
view expressed in Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Felton,24 where Severens, C. J., stated:
In the brief and argument for the appellants it is urged that
their rights cannot properly be litigated upon a mere petition
filed by the receiver in a suit to which they are not parties,
and that they are entitled to the advantage of making their
defense in a formal suit upon an independent bill. When the
proceeding is taken by'a receiver appointed in a suit to which
the proposed defendant is a stranger, the question whether it
21 See also Ex parte Renfro, 115 Tex. 82, 273 S. W. 813 (1925); State
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 48 Nev. 198, 228 P. 617 (1924);
Ex parte Devoy, 208 Mo. App. 550, 236 S. W. 1070 (1921); Commer v.
Felton, 61 F. 731 (C. C. A., 6th Cir, 1894); Havemeyer v. Superior Ct., 84
Cal. 327, 24 P. 121 (1890); Thornton v. Washington Say. Bank, 76 Va. 432
(1882); Ex parte Cohen, 5 Cal. 494 (1855).
22 Bennett v. Valley Mining Co., 142 Iowa 53, 120 N. W. 654 (1909)
Stuparich Mfg. Co. v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. 290, 55 P. 985 (1899); State
v. Ball, 5 Wash. 387, 31 P. 975 (1892); Tolleson v. Peoples' Say. Bank, 85
Ga. 171, 11 S. E. 599 (1890); Brandt v. Allen, 76 Iowa 50, 40 N. W. 82 (1888);
Ex parte Hollis, 59 Cal. 405 (1881).
23 See People v. Dist. Ct., 74 Colo. 40, 218 P. 745 (1923).
As to the
position of a purchaser from the receiver, see McCarter v. Finch, 55 N. J.
Eq. 245, 36 A. 937 (1897), where it was held that the court might proceed
summarily to recover the purchase price.
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should be by bill or petition is one resting to a certain extent
in the discretion of the court, having regard to the particular
circumstances. A leading purpose in determining it will always
be to afford the defendant full opportunity to assert and obtain the benefit of his defense. Where, as here, the property
concerned is already in the possession of the court, and the
act complained of is a disturbance of that possession, it is not
unusual to allow the receiver to proceed by petition, giving
the defendant the opportunity of making defense by answer or
other pleading, according to the common course of equity practice. This was the practice sanctioned in Ex parte Chamberlain
(C. C.) 55 Fed. 704, where the proceeding was taken to prevent
the disturbance of the receiver in the possession held by him
under the order of the court of certain property upon which the
respondent was undertaking to make a tax levy, and In re Tyler,
149 U. S. 164, 13 Sup. Ct. 785, 37 L. Ed. 689, where the respondent, under claim of right, founded upon a state statute, attempted to seize property in the hands of a receiver appointed
by the Federal circuit court ....
We see no reason for thinking
that in the present case any right of appellants could have been
compromised by the complaint being preferred by a petition
rather than by a bill. They have filed an answer in which they
set up the only defense which they claim exists, and the common replication has been filed. It remains to produce the proof,
and thereupon a final order or decree can be made upon the
merits. If there was any reason why their rights could not be
fully protected in the proceeding which was instituted, the objection should have been made in the court below. Instead of that,
they were content to answer on the merits, submitting to the
judgment of the court, without making any suggestion of difficulty or embarrassment. Nor do they raise such a question by
the assignments of error, all of which relate solely to the supposed error of the court in holding that upon the facts shown
an injunction should issue. We think that, if the particular
mode of obtaining the remedy was mistaken, the defendants have
waived the error.
In Bien v. Robinson,"2 5 after the receivers had been appointed and an order made enjoining all persons from
24 103 F. 227, 229 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., 1900).
25208 U. S. 423 (1907).
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paying over or transferring any money or assets of the
company to any person other than the receivers, an officer
of the company gave to Bien a check drawn on a bank in
which moneys of the company were on deposit. Bien
having learned of the appointment of the receivers, and
of the order, had the check certified, indorsed it and collected it through a third person. Thereupon, the receivers
filed a pettion and thereon a rule was issued by the court
appointing the receivers requiring Bien to show cause
why an order should not be made requiring him to pay to
the receivers the money so collected on the check, with
interest. The application was heard on affidavit and an
order made requiring payment to the receivers with interest, within ten days, and to this Bien sued out a writ
of error to the United States Supreme Court. One of the
grounds of error was that the right of the receivers to
the fund could not be determined in a summary proceeding, but could only be adjudged in an action at law
to recover the proceeds of the check. But this contention
the court said was "manifestly frivolous," White, J.,
stating,
Reduced to its last analysis, the contention of this branch
of the case is that a court of equity, which in the due exercise of
jurisdiction had appointed receivers of the assets and property
of the corporation and enjoined interference by others with
such property, was without power, by summary process, after
due notice and opportunity to be heard, to compel a repayment
by one who, with knowledge of the order of injunction and in
violation of its terms, took in satisfaction of an indebtedness
from a debtor to the corporation, property forming part of the
assets of such corporation. We think the contention and the
assignments of error based thereon are so manifestly frivolous
as to be utterly insufficient to serve as the foundation for a
writ of error.
The necessity of the injunctive order in Bien v. Robinson was considered in Price v. Horrigan Contracting
Company28 in the following language:
26 11 Del. Ch. 54, 95 A. 345, 346 (1915).
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In that case there was an order enjoining every person from
transferring any money of the company to any one other than
the receivers, and this fact was considered by the court, but
whether it was a necessary, or even important, fact does not
appear. Evidently the court based its decision on the interference with the administration of the affairs of the company,
and not on a disobedience of its injunctive order. It can be
readily believed, too, that the court would still have regarded
as manifestly frivolous a similar contention in a case where
there was no such injunctive order, but where by statute the
title in all the property and assets of the insolvent company
is vested in a receiver appointed for it.
In the Horrigan case, the court accordingly refused to
remit the receiver to his action at law, stating:
The proceeding taken is proper, for it gives a prompt hearing
to reach the real facts and assists the right and duty of the
court to fully administer all the assets of the company without
unnecessary formalities or delays. Because the New Jersey
court felt bound by an existing practice to have the relief by
a bill, does not prove that the proceeding by a rule to show
cause as approved by the Supreme Court of the United States
is not as suitable and proper, and on the authority of the latter
case alone, this court may rely in this matter.
To support such summary proceedings as the court
may take, it is well settled that constructive possession
by the receiver of the assets to be reduced is just as competent as physical possession. In Horn v. Pere Marquette
Railway Company,27 the receiver proceeded summarily by
petition for a rule to show cause in the court by which he
was appointed to require one not a party to the suit to
pay over money which had come into the possession of
the respondent since the appointment of the receiver and
which was retained in defiance of the court's order requesting the property and funds of the defendant, even
though the respondent claimed a right to, or lien upon,
the funds. The court briefly said:
In respect to such deposits, a petition by the receiver to pre27 151 F. 626 (Cir. Ct., E. D. Mich., S. D.).
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vent such interference and to compel the surrender of the funds
so seized is not bad practice, and does not deprive the defendant of a full and orderly hearing, and its rights'are and will
be as fully protected as in an independent suit. Such a proceeding was expressly sanctioned by the Court of Appeals of
this circuit, in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Felton, 103 Fed.
227, 43 C. C. A. 189. The opinion is authoritative in this circuit, and is a complete answer to any objection to the mode of
proceeding adopted by the receiver, assuming that the defendant
could raise such a question after answering to the merits.
Again, in McMullen v. Hurley,28 the court proceeded
summarily to require the restoration of certain personal
property, once in the possession of the receiver but removed therefrom and claimed as of right by the appellant, who moved for a dismissal of the summary proceeding on the ground that a plenary suit must be
brought. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss,
heard the evidence, and entered an order that the appellant deliver and restore the possession of the receiver,
from which order appeal was taken. Johnson, D. J.,
said:
No useful purpose would be served by reviewing the evidence
in detail. The conclusion of the trial court that the pipe of
the Gilliland Oil Company stacked in the yards of the Midland
Supply Company by the witness McCulley was taken away
by the agents and servants of appellant is sustained by the evidence. This pipe was in the yards of the Midland Supply
Company when appellees were appointed receivers, and was
later inspected, inventoried, and appraised by their agent for
them. Constructively the pipe was in the possession of the
receivers when it was removed by appellant's servants and
agents. The power of the court to protect the possession of its
receivers is too well settled to require discussion. ...
Counsel for appellees in their brief very properly say: "The
proceeding from which this appeal is prosecuted was not to determine title to the property in question, but the right of possession thereof."
-8 91 F. 374 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1923),
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The purpose of the order entered by the court below was
to vindicate the right of the receivers to the possession .of the
property, and not for the purpose of definitely and finally determining title. Thus construed, appellant has no cause to complain of the order made by the court below, and the same is
affirmed.
A court of equity taking custody of assets and placing
them in the hands of a receiver may bring summary
proceedings where a claim or right to their possession
which belonged to the defendant corporation previous to
the receivership proceeding is asserted by the receiver as
against a claim or right to their possession by the possessor which is mere pretense or simply colorable.
A brief in support of this statement of the law may rest
2
upon the case of Wood v. National Corporation,
where
this matter was thoroughly considered in an opinion particularly instructive, since it concerned the collection of
a promissory note, title to which the receiver held. It is,
therefore, justifiable to quote from the opinion of Dick-

inson, D. J., at length:
The jurisdiction which the court of equity has acquired
through and by the- filing of a receivership bill is so broad -and
sweeping in its character that it is unaffected- by- the ordinary
rules which differentiate equitable and legal remedies, and is
unaffected also by the limitations of the jurisdiction of the court
imposed by statute. As a concrete illustration, of the extent to
which the principle contended for goes, it isasserted that if
there.be among the assets of the receivership estate a promissory. note belonging to the defendant in ,the original bill, title
to. which has passed to the receiver, payment of the. note may
be. enforced by the filing of an ancillary bill, notwithstanding
the clear and adequate remedy: which an action at law would
afford, and notwithstanding,. also, that except -for the filing of
the, receivership bill a -court of 'the United States. would *be
without jurisdiction to entertain .any action -or proceeding for
the- collection of the note.
The proposition advanced was pressed at the argument at
29265 F. 791 (D.

C., E. D. Pa., 1919).
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bar to these broad limits. We cannot concur in this broad view.
Wherever a court of equity has taken into its custody property
under any lawful proceedings, its power and duty by summary
process to prevent the interference of any one with property
thus in the custody of the court is clear enough. The real
question is to what extent and within what limits it may subject third persons, not parties to the proceedings before it, to
summary process, and to what extent and within what limits
there is preserved to such third persons the protection of those
laws which could otherwise be invoked for the purposes of protection.
The distinction attempted to be made is, by analogy, the
distinction made between cases and instances in which resort
may be had in bankruptcy proceedings to summary process,
and when resort must be had to plenary process. The real
dividing line is supplied by an answer to the question of possession. If the possession be in the court, there can be no
doubt of the power of the court to protect that possession.
When there is no possession, however, but merely a claim of
right, which belonged to the defendant in the receivership proceedings, to be enforced, the general principle holds good that
the receiver has merely succeeded to all the rights of the defendant, including, of course, the right to enforce by appropriate proceedings any claim which such defendant may have
against any one. Whether the rights of the person against
whom the claim is made have been to any extent affected by
the receivership proceedings depends, among other things, upon
what his claims of right are. If it is a claim of possession,
then the inquiry is whether there is any justification for his
claim of right, or whether it is a miere pretense or simply colorable. If it is the latter, the-receiver, whose duty it is to take
possession, will be given the aid'of the court in securing such
possession by speedy summary process. If, however,*.the person
against whom the receiver, is asserting title is setting up a real
claim of right, the court will' not deal with such -person in a
summary way, but will require the receiver to assert his claims
of right by plenary process.
The possession, which is the determining fact, need not be the
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physical possession, but may be what is sometimes called "constructive possession." When the property, however, is not in
the possession of the court, but of a third party, who makes
claim thereto of such a character as that he has a right to have
the merits of his claim judicially determined, his rights remain
unaffected by the receivership proceedings, and all the rules of
law pertaining to remedies, the jurisdiction of courts, and otherwise continue in full force and must be followed. In other
words, the law is that when any property is really in the custody of the court, no one will be permitted to interfere with
such custody, and the power of the court to assert full control
over it may be invoked through an ancillary bill, regardless of
the ordinary remedies open to litigants generally, and of any
limitation of jurisdiction of the same court to entertain suits
between ordinary litigants. This we understand to be the principle upon which counsel for plaintiff rely.
When the question of the protection of property, thus in the
custody of the court, is not involved, any cause of action, which
the defendant in the receivership bill may have had, to which
the receiver has succeeded, must be asserted as it would be required to be asserted by any other litigant. The principle referred to is illustrated by a number of cases, among which are
McDowell v. McCormick, 121 Fed. 61, 57 C. C. A. 401; Wabash
v. Adelbert, 208 U. S. at page 54, 28 S. Ct. 182, 52 L. Ed. 379;
White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 15 S. Ct. 1018, 40 L. Ed. 67;
Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 13 S. Ct. 1008, 37 L. Ed. 815;
Pope v. Louisville, 173 U. S. 573, 19 S. Ct. 500, 43 L. Ed. 814.
In Davis v. Briggs,"° the court held that where a third
party sets up a claim to the property in his possession as
against the receiver, relying upon an agreement void
upon its face, the court may, in proceedings supplementar y to execution, order such party to deliver the property to the receiver appointed in the proceedings. This
does not entrench, as Justice Platt intimates, upon the
rule necessitating a separate suit where the claim is not
305 N. Y. S. 323 (1889).
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simply colorable but is based upon some reasonable
ground.3"
Under this rule it is suggested that the appointing court
may summarily order the delivery to the receiver of
assets admitted upon examination in open court by their
possessor to belong to the defendant corporation. Any
claim or right asserted with respect to such assets by the
same witness could then reasonably be regarded by the
court as being mere pretense or simply colorable. Thus,
the admission by an obligee that he owes one thousand
dollars under a promissory note payable to the defendant
corporation might be said to give the court constructive
possession of this amount and, hence, to furnish a basis
for a summary order directing the obligee to deliver its
physical possession to the receiver. This proposition,
however, must be regarded as one still open to question, if
for no other reason than that an authority directly in
point in its support is not available. The most that can
be said at this time is that the modern trend of judicial
legislation points to its recognition.
A court of equity taking custody of assets and placing
them in the hands of a receiver has no right to bring summary proceedings against strangers to the suit having
possession of supposed assets and showing a reasonable
and adverse claim to the title or right to possession. It
is well settled that under such circumstances the receiver
has neither physical nor constructive possession. It is
equally well settled that such strangers have the right
to have the merits of their claim judicially determined according to all the rules of law and jurisdiction.
In Sachs v. Sachs,12 an order was entered upon the petition of the receiver directing him to take possession of
the defendant corporation 's bank deposit. The Appellate
31 See also Clark on Receivers, (2nd Ed.), I, sec. 584; Bibber-White Co.
v. White River Valley Electric R. Co., 107 F. 176 (Cir. Ct., D. Vt., 1901);
Miles v. New South Bldg. & Loan Assn., 95 F. 919 (Cir. Ct., N. D. Ga.,
1899); Lilienthal v. Wallach, 37 F. 241 (Cir Ct., S. D. N. Y., 1889); Delano
v. Malcdlmson-Houghton Co., 183 Mich. 62, 148 N. W. 749 (1914): Re Flynn,
141 N. Y. S. 807 (1913).
3 181 Ill. App. 342 (1st Dist., 1913).
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Court held that the relation between the defendant corporation and the bank was one of debtor and creditor and,
accordingly, that the receiver was obliged to resort to a
separate action to determine his right to the deposit,
since the bank was not a party to the receivership suit,
and it claimed the right to appropriate the deposit in payment of a note. Barnes, J., said:
The record discloses no question of fraud, nor any circumstances or evidence tending to show any relation of agency or
of a fiduciary character on the part of the bank toward either
the corporation or the copartnership. Its relation to the copartnership was the simple one of debtor and creditor that
exists between a bank and a depositor, and, as a general rule,
a bank may deduct from the depositor's account a debt due
from him. .

.

. Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank v. Blumenzweig, 46

Ill. App. 297. It plainly appears that the corporation was liable
to the bank for the amount due on the note in question when
it was deducted from the account. If the deduction was wrongfully made, the corporation itself had no remedy except by an
appropriate action to recover a debt, and the receiver, asserting
a claim thereto, would be obliged to resort to a separate action,
as the bank claimed title to the fund and was not a party to
the receivership proceedings. ...
The petition, therefore, should have been dismissed not only
for the reason that it lacked any averment of jurisdiction of
the court over the respondent, it not showing either that the
bank was party to the decree, or that the account in question
was adjudicated therein, or that the bank was in possession of
any property of the copartnership as agent or otherwise, but
because respondent 's answer disclosed that the petition related
to a fund to which one not a party to the original proceeding,
nor alleged to be the agent of one, was asserting an adverse
claim which the court had no power to try in such summary
fashion.
The theory of the proceeding was that the court acquired
jurisdiction of the respondent merely by a demand of the receiver for the fund accompanied by a notice of the decree.
But the bank was not bound by said decree. Its rights had
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not been adjudicated therein, and neither its claim nor that of
the receiver against it could be adjudicated upon a rule entered
in a cause to which the bank was a stranger."8

The Supreme Court of Illinois has upon several occasions affirmed the view as stated.3 4 Cases to be found in
the Federal reports are equally firm in requiring a receiver to bring a separate action to obtain possession of
property from a stranger to the record who claims adversely.8 5
CONTEMPT

It would be mockery for the court to proceed summarily concerning the assets of the defendant corporation
were it not able to enforce its orders issued in connection
therewith. While the means available to equity in this
regard are various, a method commonly and effectively
used is an exercise of its power to punish for contempt.
There is, however, no contempt where the order directing
the delivery of possession fails to come within the scope
of summary proceedings as summarized above. On the
other hand, where the order is within such scope, disobedience to it is contempt. As stated in Elwell v. Goodnow," by Start, C. J.:
All orders made by courts in matters of which they have jurisdiction must be obeyed, although improvidently made. If they
are wrong, application should be made to the court to correct
them, and, if the evidence shows a voluntary disobedience of
the orders in question by the relator, his conviction was right.
33 The Appellate Court considered the effectiveness of such a similar decree
in Christie v. Burns, 83 Ill. App. 514, (1st Dist., 1898).
84 Republic Life Insurance Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150 (1890).
35 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnson, 275 F. 112 (Dist. Ct., E. D. Mich.,
S. D., 1921); Wheaton v. Daily Telegraph Co., 124 F. 61 (C. C. A., 2nd
Cir., 1903). See also Wood v. National Corporation, 265 F. 791 (Dist. Ct.,
E. D. Pa., 1919); Horn v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 151 F. 626 (Cir. Ct., E.
D. Mich., S. D., 1907); Sullivan v. Colby, 71 F. 460 (C. C. A., 7th Cir.,
1896); Hook v. Bosworth, 64 F. 443 (C. C. A., 7th Cir., 1894); Comer v.
Felton, 61 F. 731 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., 1894). See also Re Muehfeld, 45 N. Y. S.
16 (1897) and Keyser v. Erickson, 61 Utah 179, 211 P. 698 (1922).
3671 Minn. 383, 73 N. W. 1092 (1898).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

Accordingly, if the possession of the property cannot
be said to be in the court, disobedience to the order reducing to possession is not contempt. Upon this basis it was
held in Struckmeyer v. The People,3 7 that a refusal to pay
a money decree was not contempt. Presiding Justice
Freeman said:
The appeal before us is not from the decree, but from the
order adjudging appellant guilty of contempt of court for failing to comply with it and pay appellee the amount of the latter's
judgment against H. C. Degner. Appellee endeavors to justify
the decree and the order by reason of a prior order entered,
it is said, with appellant's consent, to the effect that "he retain
in his hands until the further order of court out of the moneys
which have heretofore been paid over to him from the estate
of Mette Degner, deceased, as assignee of the claim and interest of Herman Degner in said estate," sufficient for the purpose of paying appellee's judgment. The contention is that
thereafter appellant held this money, which the court now finds
to be entirely his own, "as a receiver or other officer of court
might have done for the benefit of Weimers, the judgment
creditor of Degner." It would seem that the statement of this
proposition is its sufficient refutation.
But where the possession is in the court, the rule is
otherwise; and it makes no difference whether the possession is physical or constructive. In Richards v. The People,38 Dickey, J., stated:
But, conceding the appointment of the receiver to have been
valid, it is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that no
contempt was committed, since there was no actual interference
with the receiver's possession.
In this view of the case we can not concur. It is based upon
the mistaken theory that property or credits not yet actually
reduced to the receiver's possession, although the title thereto
has vested in him by virtue of his appointment, may be seized
or attached by creditors of the original debtor, with impunity,
and that in so doing they are guilty of no interference with the
37 133 IlM. App. 336 (lst Dist., 1907).

1 81 IIl. 551 (1876).
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rights of the receiver. But it is to be remembered that the receiver is the officer of the court, and that his possession is the
possession of the court itself; and any unauthorized interference therewith, either by taking forcible possession of the property committed to his charge, or by legal proceedings for that
purpose, without the sanction of the court appointing him, is
a direct and immediate contempt of court, and punishable by
attachment ...
And, in our view of the case, it can make no difference in
the application of the rule, whether the property is actually,
or only constructively, in the receiver's possession. 39
Whether a disobedience to the order of the court is to
be deemed criminal or civil has been said to depend upon
whether it is the authority of the court or the rights of
the parties that has been disregarded, the former being
criminal, the latter civil. In the case of In re Nevitt,4O
Sanborn, J., said:
Proceedings for contempts are of two classes,-those prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the
courts, and to punish for disobedience of their orders, and those
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties
to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to
enforce the rights and administer the remedies to which the
court has found them to be entitled. The former are criminal
and punitive in their nature, and the government, the courts,
and the people are interested in their prosecution. The latter
are civil, remedial, and coercive in their nature, and the parties
chiefly in interest in their conduct and prosecution are the individuals whose private rights and remedies they were instituted to protect or enforce. . . . A criminal contempt involves
no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power
and dignity of the court, and private parties have little if any
interest in the proceedings for its punishment. But if the contempt consists in the refusal of a party or a person to do an
See also Manning
39Approved in Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 I1. 556 (1889).
v. Securities Co., 242 Il. 584 (1909); Burnbam v. Barrett, 137 Ill. App.
119 (lst Dist., 1907); Wyatt v. 0. & M. R. R. Co., 10 Ill. App. 289 (3rd
Dist., 188]).
40 117 F. 448 at p. 458 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1902).
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act which the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or
the advantage of a party to a suit or action pending before
it, and he is committed until he complies with the order, the
commitment is in the nature of an execution to enforce the
judgment of the court, and the party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party in interest in the proceed41
ings.
Distinguishing criminal and civil contempt upon this
basis, courts have held criminal contempt to have been
committed where there has been an actual, physical interference with the receivership property ;42 or a suit
brought against receiver without the permission, or consent, of the receivership court ;43 or an execution of legal
process against the property."
Civil contempt in receivership cases usually arises, however, out of failure to
comply with an order of the court directing a party to
turn property in his possession over to the receiver;45
or out of failure to appear for examination pursuant to
an order of the court concerning the receivership property or refusing to answer questions
or giving evasive
46
answers on such examination.
The Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted in Holbrook v. Ford,47 with the task of determining whether interference with the property of the defendant corpora-

tion by attaching it was criminal or civil contempt. It
holding it to be civil contempt only, Magruder, J., stated:
Contempts have been classified into direct and constructive,
the former being those committed in the presence of the court
or so near as to interrupt its proceedings, the latter being those
which arise from matters not transpiring in court, but from
41 Approved in Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324 (1904).
42Strain v. Superior Ct., 168 Cal. 216, 142 P. 62 (1914).
43 Ridge v. Manker, 132 F. 599 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1904).
44Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 Ill. 556 (1889).
45 Ex parte Corran, 108 Cal. 247, 41 P. 464 (1895).
46
In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (C. C. A., 2nd Cir., 1913). In general, see
John W. Smith, A Treatise on the Law and Procedure of Receivers, (2nd Ed.
by Henry G. Tardy, Bender-Moss Co., San Francisco, Cal., 1920), II, sees.
775, 776, where other authorities are cited.
47 153 Ill. 633 (1894).
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refusal to obey its orders and decrees that are to be performed
elsewhere. Interfering with property in the possession of a
receiver is a constructive contempt. . . . Contempts have been
still further classified into criminal and civil, the former being
acts in disrespect of the court or its process, or tending to bring
it into disrepute, or obstruct the administration of justice; the
latter being "those quasi contempts which consist in failing to
do something which the contemner is ordered by the court to do
for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding
before the court." . . ."If the contempt consist in the refusal
of a party to do something which he is ordered to do for the
benefit or advantage of the opposite party, the process is civil."
.. .In such case "the private party alone is interested in the
enforcement of the order, and the moment he is satisfied, the
imprisonment terminates." . . . A motion to commit for such
a contempt may be answered by showing that the party complaining of it has waived it. "Waiver only applies where the
contempt has arisen from breach of an order made in favor
of any party-not, of course, to contempts of the court itself." ...
In the case at bar, the order of committal because of refusal
to dismiss the foreign suits was made for the benefit and advantage of Palmer, the complainant in the creditor's bill.
The foregoing distinction between criminal and civil
contempt is an important one. The differences involved
have been considered at length by the United States Supreme Court in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Railroad
Company.48 For our purpose it is sufficient to call attention to the two following points.
1. The Refusal. "While the court, to vindicate its
authority, may punish as for a criminal contempt one
who has it in his power to obey but willfully disobeys its
order to pay over money to another, or who, after the institution of proceedings, has willfully disabled himself
from complying therewith, it has no legal power to endeavor to enforce such an order in aid of the party to
whom the money is to be paid, by civil contempt pro48221 U. S. 418 (1911).
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ceedings resulting in a decree committing the contemner
to jail until he shall have complied with the original order,
unless the evidence in the contempt proceedings clearly
demonstrates a present ability and a willful refusal to
49
obey. " ,

In Clay v. Waters, 0 the defendant's counsel urged that
the judgment for contempt for the disobedience of the
court's order could not stand because his answer showed
that he could not comply with it. Sanborn, C. J., however,
declared that the willful interference with the custody of
the court amounted to criminal contempt, and that the
inability of the defendant to comply being by reason of
his own acts, the judgment must be affirmed.
If, however, the defendant in Clay v. Waters had shown
that he had never been able to comply with the order, then
the order of commitment would have been reversed. In
the recent case of The People v. LaMothe,51 Partlow, C.,
stated:
The power of a court of equity to punish for contempt by imprisonment upon the refusal of a trustee to pay over money
actually received and wrongfully withheld is well established.
. . .It is no defense in such a case that the fund has been
devoted to other purposes .... In People v. Zimmer, supra. it
was held that where a receiver has wrongfully converted or expended money in his hands and is proceeded against, in the
cause in which he was appointed, for contempt on account of
his failure to comply with an order to pay, his inability to
pay, resulting from the wrongful act, does not present a de-

fense to the proceeding, and he may be imprisoned for contempt notwithstanding his inability to pay.... No one should
be imprisoned for a failure to pay money unless the evidence
clearly shows that the party charged has the money within his
power to pay, or that he had the money and wrongfully disposed of it. Courts may imprison for willful defiance, but they

will not imprison for a failure to comply with a decree where
the disobedience is not willful ....

The mere fact that a court

Smith on Receivers, (2nd Ed.), II, sec. 776.
50 178 F. 385 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1910).
51331 111. 351 (1928).
49
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of equity has rendered a decree fixing a money liability does
not authorize it to imprison to enforce. the payment without
:regard to the relation of the parties to each other or to the
court. . . . Where imprisonments have been sustained the decisions are based upon the fact that the party charged actually
had the money in his hands or had wrongfully disposed of it.
None of them is based upon a constructive possession of the
money because of the party's association with the person who
had actually received the money. No man can be legally imprisoned for a failure to pay over money he does not have and
never had.
- On the other hand, in Freed v. Central Trust Company
of Illinois,5 2 the contempt proceeding was civil. An order
had been entered directing the appellant to turn over
$1,100 to the receiver of the defendant corporation. Failing to comply therewith, he was committed to jail "until
he deliver to the receiver . . . the sum of $1,100 or until
the further order of this court or until otherwise released
by law."
In reversing this order of commitment, Mack,
C. J., said:
Coming, then, to a consideration of the merits of the case,
we start with the proper concession of the receiver's counsel
that while the court, to vindicate its authority, may punish as
for a criminal contempt one who has it in his power to obey
but willfully disobeys its order to pay over money to another,
or who, after the institution of proceedings, has willfully disabled himself from complying therewith, it has no legal power
to endeavor to enforce such an order in aid of the party to
whom the money is to be paid, by civil contempt proceedings
resulting in a decree committing the contemner to jail until
he shall have complied with the original order, unless the evidence in the contempt proceedings clearly demonstrates a present ability and a willful refusal to obey. ...
Neither from the allegations of the petition nor from the
findings of the court does it appear that Freed, on November
29th or at any time after the entry of the default order of
October 24th, was able to comply therewith.
52215 F. 873 (C. C. A., 7th Cir., 1914).
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The testimony as certified by the judge demonstrates the
contrary. At the best, the default on October 24th amounted
to an admission of the finding then made that Freed then had
the money in his control. But in the absence of any affirmative evidence whatsoever to contradict the testimony both of
Freed and of his wife that the money had been used for household and other expenses at some time prior to the hearing in
November, the finding in the order of October 24th, even regarded as an admission, would not justify a finding on November 29th of present ability to pay or an order of commitment
until payment based thereon ...
It is, of course, immaterial what property the wife may have
had; the coercion of civil contempt proceedings is personal,
based on personal ability to perform, not on a hope of intervention by friends or relatives.
The very language of the order of commitment, that on
October 24th "Freed had in his possession and control money
or property of sufficient value to comply with the order," in
the absence of any allegation or finding of any ability to comply therewith at any later date, would indicate that the court
erroneously deemed this fact sufficient.
2. The Punishment.
The instructive opinion of
Lamar, J., in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co.," defines
the character of the punishment for contempt, both criminal and civil, as follows:
If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for
the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of
the court. It is true that punishment by imprisonment may
be remedial as well as punitive, and many civil contempt proceedings have resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable to the complainant, but also in committing the defendant
to prison. But imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered
where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form or
substance, was mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in
53221 U. S. 418 at p. 441 (1911).
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such cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to
be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do. The decree in such cases is that the defendant
stand committed unless and until he performs the affirmative
act required by the court's order.
For example: If a defendant should refuse to pay alimony,
or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance required by a decree for specific
performance, he could be committed until he complied with the
order. Unless there were special elements of contumacy, the
refusal to pay or to comply with the order is treated as being
rather in resistance to the opposite party than in contempt of
the court. The order for imprisonment in this class of cases,
therefore, is not to vindicate the authority of the law, but is
remedial, and is intended to coerce the defendant to do the
thing required by the order for the benefit of the complainant.
If imprisoned, as aptly said in Re Nevitt, 54 C. C. A. 622,
117 Fed. 451, "he carries the keys of his prison in his own
pocket."
He can end the sentence and discharge himself at
any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.
On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has
been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has
been done, nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury
caused by the disobedience. If the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period, the defendant is furnished no
key, and he cannot shorten the term by promising not to rep.eat the offense. Such imprisonment operates not as a remedy
coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience.
It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect. For if the case is civil and the punishment is
purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's
authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal
contempt and the imprisonment is solely punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the law, the complainant may also derive some
incidental benefit from the fact that such punishment tends
to prevent a repetition of the disobedience. But such indirect
consequences will not ehange imprisonment which is merely
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coercive and remedial, into that which is solely punitive in
character, or vice versa.

The rule was above stated that the refusal of one appearing in the receivership suit pursuant to an order of
the court (it being immaterial whether he be a party to
the proceeding), to answer upon examination concerning
the receivership property, or the giving by him of evasive
answers, may amount to civil contempt. The question
that now arises is, what are the limits of the application
of this rule? More specifically, to what extent may perjury be made the basis for punishment for contempt?
The clearness of the answer given to this question by
Hand, D. J., in the District Court, Southern District of
New York, justifies a lengthy quotation from his opinion,
approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals in In re
Cantor,54 where it appears in extract form, as follows:
There is an especially proper reason for this, because in the
case of alleged perjury so much depends upon the witness' bearing. When his words appear in print, it is sometimes possible
to see that he is either evasive, or a downright perjurer, but
generally it is extremely difficult to tell. This is especially
true in the case of men of small education, to whom English
is not a native tongue. Again and again such men within two
consecutive sentences give the most contradictory answers. It
is quite clear that they cannot mean this deliberately, but that
they have not understood. In criminal contempts the accused
has all the substantive benefits of one indicted ...

among them

that of the degree of proof and without some certificate of the
commissioner I certainly cannot say on this record that beyond
a reasonable doubt this man was deliberately blocking the
course of the proceeding by swearing to what he knew was
false. The power undoubtedly exists, but it ought to be used
very circumspectly.

By that, I do not mean that it ought to

be surrounded with absurd technicality which will destroy its
value, but I do mean that all reasonable explanations should
be made. A judge ought not to commit a man for contempt
for perjury except in so plain a case as makes further attempt
to examine the witness a farce, so obviously that no observer,
54
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who was present 'could doubt that the* witness was obviously
trifling with the proceeding. He ought not to judge upon the
balance of proof introduced to contradict the witness and so
turn the examination into a trial of perjury, for this trenches
on the criminal law itself. And, while the line cannot be abstractly stated with success, it can be so administered, if the
judges will remember the purpose which it answers, and loyally
accept the limitations which. the defendant's right to a jury
trial throws upon them.
There is.one thing more: Every judicial proceeding and
every charge to which another must respond justly requires that
the respondent should know with reasonable definition what
lie has to answer. It will not do, as in this case, to throw at
a man 120 pages of testimony and say generally that it is
generally permeated with perjury. Some specification the most
elementary rules of fair play demand, so that he may explain
what he is charged with, and so that the judge may know on what
the moving party relies. Nor is it any answer to say that the
absurd precision of an old indictment at common law is not
necessary; which, of course, it is not. The requirement is
practical and will be treated practically, but for all that it is
none the less real and necessary, and it is a condition, so far
as I know, of every kind of judicial proceeding in every free
country.
The result is that unlike the procedure in civil contempt, in accordance with which the person committed is
entitled to a full hearing as to the validity and enforceability of the order, in criminal contempt, as is perjury,
the proceeding is in the highest degree summary, subject
to the proviso that the contempt must be committed in
the presence of the court. Then, and only then, the
judgment and punishment may be immediate and upon
the spot, as service of process is not necessary.
In
such a case the only requisite is that the order set out
fully in what the contempt consisted, because an order is
55
reviewable upon appeal.
55 See The People v. Gard, 259 111. 238 (1913); The People v. Stone, 181
Ill. App. 475 (1st Dist., 1913); Ferriman v. The People, 128 III. App. 230
(4th Dist., 1906); Rawson v. Rawson, 35 IIl. App. 505 (1st Dist., 1888).

